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PREVIEW; High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty,
Co.: Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine
Deanna Rothwell
The Ninth Circuit was originally set to hear oral argument on this
matter on Tuesday, March 31, 2020. On March 11, 2020, the Court
deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument.
Nonetheless, given the importance of the issues presented by this
extraordinary writ, the Montana Law Review presents the following
preview for High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents the issue of when the attorney-client privilege
and work product protections can be waived. An employee of High
Country Paving, Inc. (“High Country”) was involved in an automobile
accident that resulted in the death of one and the serious injury of
another. High Country’s liability insurer, United Fire & Casualty Co.
(“United Fire”), settled with the third-party victims for policy limits
without obtaining a release for High Country. As a result, High Country
sued United Fire for unfair claim settlement practices and breach of
contract.
During discovery, both parties moved to compel the production of
privileged information which the district court granted. On November
11, 2019, High Country filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the
mental impressions of its attorneys are not directly at issue in this case,
and, therefore, there was no waiver of privileges. Additionally, High
Country argues that United Fire failed to establish the requirements
necessary to discover work product. United Fire contends that High
Country placed its attorneys’ mental impressions directly at issue and
that, therefore, discovery of attorney communications and work product
is warranted.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2016,1 a High Country employee was involved in an
automobile accident that killed one person and injured another.2
Following the accident, the injured parties filed a third-party claim that
Plaintiff’s Preliminary Pretrial Statement at 3, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire &
Casualty Co. (D. Mont. Mar. 27, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).
2
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 3, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (9th
Cir. Nov. 12, 2019) (No. 19-72853).
1
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triggered High Country’s liability coverage.3 United Fire was High
Country’s liability insurer at the time of the accident.4 United Fire settled
with the third-party claimants for policy limits.5 Notably, United Fire,
over High Country’s objection, failed to obtain a release for High
Country as part of the settlement. 6 High Country then separately
negotiated a settlement with the third-party claimants, “paying an
additional $1.275 million and assigning certain legal claims in exchange
for a release.”7 High Country then sued United Fire in federal court
alleging state law claims for unfair claim settlement practices8 and
breach of contract.9 United Fire argued that it acted reasonably in
“paying the policy limits without obtaining a release” and “in relying on
the advice of counsel in making coverage decisions.”10
Both United Fire and High Country filed motions to compel
disclosure of attorney-client privileged communications and documents
protected by the work-product doctrine.11 United Fire sought to discover
“any communications containing any evaluation” of the third-party
claims12 to “corroborate United Fire’s conclusion.”13 Both motions were
granted.14 The district court found that there was a waiver of both
privileges by High Country for two reasons.15 First, although High
Country had not designated its attorneys as expert witnesses, it did place
its attorney’s letters and valuations of the underlying case directly at
issue.16 The district court found that this amounted to a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege by High Country.17 Second, the district court
determined that although the evaluations were indisputably prepared “in
anticipation of litigation,” High Country put the assessments at issue by
3

Id.
Id.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Id
7
Id.
8
First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 22-25, High Country Paving, Inc. v.
United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).
9
Id. at 25-30.
10
Answer to Amended Complaint at 20-22, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty
Co. (D. Mont. April 18, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).
11
See Plaintiff’s Combined Brief Re: Motions to Compel, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire
& Casualty Co. (D. Mont. Aug. 2, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM); See also Defendant’s Motion to
Compel Based on Waiver of Work Product and Attorney-Client Privilege, High Country Paving,
Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont. July 15, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).
12
Defendant’s Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 1.
13
Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Based on Waiver of Work Product and
Attorney-Client Privilege at 7, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont.
July 15, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).
14
Opinion and Order at 14, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont.
Nov. 4, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).
15
Id. at 10–12.
16
Id. at 11.
17
Id.
4
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“challenging the reasonableness of United Fire’s settlement decision.”18
Because there was no other source for information regarding High
Country’s assessment of its legal liability, any work product protection
was waived.19 High Country then filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
with the Ninth Circuit asking the Court to vacate the district court’s
order.20
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A.

Background

As a threshold matter, in federal diversity cases, privilege issues are
controlled by the forum state’s substantive law, while work product
issues are governed by federal law.21 Accordingly, in this case, Montana
law governs the attorney-client privilege issue while federal law applies
to the work product doctrine dispute.
Both parties utilize Dion v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company22 and Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Insurance Exchange23 as
the main authorities in this case. Dion involved a motion to compel both
attorney-client communications and work product from an insurance
company that refused to pay some of the plaintiff’s claims for benefits.24
The Court held that the work product at issue was discoverable under
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the insurance
company had waived the opinion work product protection.25 First, the
Court found that because the plaintiff’s claims required her to establish
that the insurer lacked reasonable justification for refusing the payments,
the mental impressions and opinions of the insurer, and therefore its
attorneys, were directly at issue and the plaintiff’s need for that
information was overwhelming based on the fact that claim processing
“is almost entirely an internal operation and [the insurer’s] claims file
reflects a unique, contemporaneous record of the handling of the
claim.”26 Second, the Court found that in naming its attorney as an expert
witness, the insurance company waived its opinion work product

18

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
20
See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2.
21
Opinion and Order, supra note 14, at 2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 501.
22
185 F.R.D. 288 (D. Mont. 1998).
23
861 P.2d 895 (Mont. 1993).
24
Id. at 290–92.
25
Id. at 292–94.
26
Id. at 292–93.
19
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protection because without discovery of those files, the plaintiff’s ability
to effectively cross examine witnesses would be impaired.27
In Palmer, the plaintiff sued an insurance company for bad faith.28
The district court had allowed evidence from an underlying trial,
including privileged information, to be admitted.29 The plaintiff claimed
that the insurance company waived its privilege by stating it would retain
new counsel in order to potentially call its original counsel as
witnesses.30 The Court determined that this statement did not amount to a
waiver because it had not been sent until a year after the district court
ordered the production of the insurer’s privilege documents and that
“even then, [the insurer] stated that the attorney’s would testify to factual
matters, but would not testify regarding confidential privileged
information.”31 The Court further denied the insured’s claims that the
insurer waived attorney-client privilege and stated that reliance on an
attorney’s advice is not the crucial factor in determining waiver.32
The Palmer Court also detailed the difference between ordinary
work product and opinion work product.33 To discover materials
considered ordinary work product, a party must establish that the
materials are relevant, the party must demonstrate a substantial need for
the materials, and the party cannot obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials through other means, without undue hardship.34 The Court
applied this test and held that in a bad faith case, the insurer’s mental
impressions and opinions are directly at issue to determine whether an
insurer’s denial is reasonable.35 However, the Court also made clear that
without an advice of counsel defense, the attorney’s mental impressions
and opinions are not at issue and relevant opinion work product is not
discoverable.36
B.

High Country’s Argument

High Country presents three main arguments: (1) it did not bring
any claim or defense that put the attorney’s mental impressions directly
at issue; (2) it did not name its attorney’s as expert witnesses; and (3)

27

Id. at 293.
Palmer, 861 P.2d at 899.
29
Id. at 899–900.
30
Id. at 900.
31
Id. at 906.
32
Id. at 907.
33
Id. at 910.
34
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
35
Palmer, 861 P.2d at 911.
36
Id. at 911–12.
28
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United Fire cannot show the requisite “overwhelming” need in order to
be granted discovery of protected work product.
High Country presents two reasons in support of its argument that it
has not waived attorney-client privilege. The first reason is that High
Country did not put the attorney’s mental impressions directly at issue
because the letters sent to United Fire are not waivers37 and the issue in
this case does not call into question the mental impressions of High
Country’s attorneys.38 High Country contends that sending the letters to
United Fire did not amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
because both letters only stated the public legal position of High
Country39 and do not contain the valuations or assessments of its
attorneys.40 High Country argues that the letters are not an affirmative
use of privileged information.41 High Country also argues that the issue
in this case is whether United Fire breached its duties to High Country by
unfairly prioritizing its own interests, and therefore, the issue does not
put High Country’s attorneys’ mental impressions directly at issue.42
The second reason High Country argues it has not waived attorneyclient privilege is that High Country named its attorneys as fact, not
expert, witnesses.43 Thus, their potential testimony does not amount to a
waiver.44 High Country contends that asking the court for a ruling based
on what the attorneys might say acts would amount to an improper
advisory opinion and is inappropriate.45 High Country agrees with United
Fire that if its attorneys were to testify about work product or privileged
communications, then it would be a waiver on the part of High
Country.46 High Country also agrees with United Fire’s assertion that
testimony from High Country’s attorneys is not necessary and that it has
no intention of calling either attorney unless it is deemed necessary to
rebut other witnesses.47 These two circumstances, according to High
Country, makes the district court’s advisory decision improper and
inappropriate.
High Country asserts that its work product remains protected for the
same two reasons detailed above as well as because United Fire has not
Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 10.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 21.
39
Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 11.
40
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 20.
41
Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 11–12.
42
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 6.
43
Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 12–13.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 13.
46
Id. at 13–14.
47
Id. at 14.
37
38
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shown the “overwhelming” need required, absent a waiver, to access
High Country’s opinion work product.48 The “conclusions, analysis,
advice and legal theories” of a party’s attorneys are considered opinion
work product which is highly protected.49 High Country contends that the
arguments United Fire puts forth to obtain access to High Country’s
opinion work product does not meet the exacting standard required to
overcome opinion work product protection.50
C.

United Fire’s Argument

United Fire has two main arguments: (1) High Country has waived
both its attorney-client privilege and its opinion work product protection
regarding the evaluations of liability produced by its attorneys; and (2) it
can show the relevance, need, and hardship required to overcome the
work-product privilege High Country has asserted in relation to the
evaluations of its potential liability
With respect to the first argument, United Fire contends that High
Country has waived the attorney-client privilege by entering into
evidence the letters sent by High Country’s attorney because those letters
contain the opinions of its attorneys and therefore puts the attorneys’
mental impressions directly at issue.51 United Fire argues that, based on
the analysis done by the Court in Dion,52 the attorney-client privilege
was waived because High Country is intending to utilize its attorneys as
witnesses and has made the confidential communications a material
issue.53 United Fire asserts that the designation of High Country’s
attorneys as fact witnesses does not distinguish this case from Dion.54
Further, United Fire asserts that the use of the letters sent by its attorneys
to United Fire as evidence have the same effect as its counsel testifying
to his opinions.55 Thus, introduction of those letters waives the
privilege.56
Overall, United Fire argues that not allowing it to have access to the
attorney-client communications “prejudices [its] defense of this
action.”57 United Fire also contends that High Country’s attorneys have
no purely factual information that could not be offered by another and
48

Id. at 14–15.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 16.
50
Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 15.
51
Id. at 16.
52
Dion, 185 F.R.D. at 294–95.
53
Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 13, at 16–17.
54
Id. at 18.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 19–20.
49
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therefore, any testimony they would give would implicate his thoughts,
making discovery necessary.58
With respect to the second argument, United Fire argues that there
are multiple ways in which High County’s evaluations are relevant. One,
United Fire argues that, based on the interrogatories, High Country is
taking the position that $3 million was not a reasonable settlement value
of the claims which makes the attorney’s valuations relevant to the
credibility of that position.59 Two, United Fire argues that High
Country’s attorney’s evaluations are relevant because the fact that High
Country was willing to pay an additional $1.275 million insinuates that
the internal evaluations will corroborate United Fire’s evaluation that the
claim’s settlement value exceeded $3 million.60 Third, United Fire also
contends that High Country’s argument that United Fire took away High
Country’s ability to escape paying its own money to the claimants makes
all internal assessments relevant.61
United Fire contends that it has shown the need required for the
discovery of work product through the following arguments. First,
United Fire claims it is critical to know the settlement value of the claims
for multiple reasons. It claims that the settlement value is critical
because if High Country’s evaluations support United Fire’s evaluation,
then the Montana Supreme Court will affirm United Fire’s decision to
pay the policy limit without a release.62 It also asserts that High
Country’s evaluations assess the credibility of High Country’s statement
that its liability could be less than $3 million.63 Finally, United Fire
maintains High Country’s claims evaluations will demonstrate whether
High Country actually believed that United Fire took away the ability of
High Country to escape paying its own money.64
United Fire argues that it also meets the third element required to
waive work product protection because it has no other way to obtain that
information except for through depositions and High Country’s written
evaluations.65

58

Id. at 20.
Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 13, at 2.
60
Id. at 2–3.
61
Id. at 3.
62
Id. at 13.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 13.
65
Id. at 15.
59
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ANALYSIS

The critical questions before the court are as follows: (1) whether
High Country placed its attorney’s letters and valuations directly at issue;
and (2) whether United Fire has shown the requisite relevance, need, and
hardship for the discovery of ordinary work product plus the additional
overwhelming or compelling need for discovery of opinion work
product. In both Palmer and Dion, the Court dealt with motions to
compel directed at insurance companies. This appeal, on the other hand,
is dealing with a motion to compel directed at the insured. This
distinction alters the analysis because the Court must determine how the
standards put in place in Palmer and Dion apply to the insured.
Nevertheless, some cases have dealt with motions to compel against the
insured and discovery of privileged or protected documents.
One such case is MapleWood Partners, L.P. v. Indian Harbor Ins.
Co., which held that by bringing a breach of contract suit that alleged
unfair allocation of coverage, the plaintiff placed its attorney’s
assessments whether the allocation was fair directly at issue, thereby
waiving any attorney-client privilege.67 High Country distinguishes
Maplewood Partners and argues that the issue is this case is not about
the fairness of the settlement but is instead about whether United Fire
breached its duties to High Country by unfairly prioritizing its own
interests.68
66

In determining the answer to this first question, the Ninth Circuit
will have to decide whether the issue is centrally about the fairness of the
settlement or about what Montana law requires of insurance companies.
If the Ninth Circuit determines that the case is about the first question,
then it is likely that, following its prior holding in Palmer, the Court will
likely affirm and find that the mental impressions of High Country’s
attorneys are actual issues in the case, making discovery necessary.
However, if the Court determines that the question here is more centrally
about whether Montana law requires insurance companies to pay out
reasonably clear damages without a release, it is possible the Ninth
Circuit would find that the mental impressions of the attorneys are not at
issue, except for those of counsel for United Fire who did assert an
advice of counsel defense. Further, the Ninth Circuit will need to
consider whether the letters High Country has offered into evidence
simply state the public legal opinion of High Country, or if they contain
66
67
68

2011 WL 3918597 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2011).
Id. at 8.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 6.
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attorney valuations that therefore waive privilege.69 The Ninth Circuit
must also determine whether High Country’s actions in calling its
attorneys as fact witnesses distinguishes this case from Dion.70 This
Court’s holding in Palmer stated that calling an attorney as a fact witness
is a distinction,71 however, High Country has admitted letters that,
depending on the Court’s ruling on the above question, may negate this
distinction.
In determining the answer to the second question, the Ninth Circuit
will need to again consider whether the mental impressions of High
Country’s attorneys are directly at issue in this case in order to determine
the relevance and need requirements for discovery of work product. If
the Court determines that the mental impressions are not at issue, it is
likely that work product would not be discoverable because the three
requirements set forth in Rule 26(b)(3)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would not be met. However, if the Court does determine that
the mental impressions are directly at issue, then both the attorney-client
privilege, which also grants greater protection to opinion work product,
and the ordinary work product protection, would likely be held to have
been waived and therefore discoverable.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court must further define what “directly at issue” means in the
context of privilege and whether the mental impressions of the insured’s
attorneys are at issue in cases where the insured is disputing the decision
of the insurer. If the Court determines that in disputing the actions of an
insurer, an insured is putting the mental impressions of its attorneys
directly at issue, this can have far reaching impacts on privilege
generally, potentially decreasing the protection that the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine provide. However, the ruling may
also be narrowly construed, similar to the rulings that have held that
utilizing an advice of counsel defense is always a waiver. If that is the
case, then this ruling has the potential to clarify the boundaries of the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 11–12.
Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 13, at 18; Plaintiff’s Combined
Brief, supra note 11, at 9–10.
71
Palmer, 861 P.2d at 906.
69
70

